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ABSTRACT
This article is concerned with the liability of search engines for algorithmically pro-
duced search suggestions, such as through Google’s ‘autocomplete’ function. Liability
in this context may arise when automatically generated associations have an offensive
or defamatory meaning, or may even induce infringement of intellectual property
rights. The increasing number of cases that have been brought before courts all over
the world puts forward questions on the conﬂict of fundamental freedoms of speech
and access to information on the one hand, and personality rights of individuals—
under a broader right of informational self-determination—on the other. In the light
of the recent judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union (EU) in Google
Spain v AEPD, this article concludes that many requests for removal of suggestions
including private individuals’ information will be successful on the basis of EU data
protection law, even absent prejudice to the person concerned.
KEYWORDS : ISP liability; defamation; data protection; trade mark infringement; in-
tellectual property; freedom of speech; false light; right to be forgotten
1. INTRODUCTION
This article is concerned with the liability of search engines for automatically pro-
duced search suggestions. With a number of cases having being brought before
courts all over the world, Google Instant Search, also known as the autocomplete
suggestion function, has become a paradigmatic instance where freedom of informa-
tion and personality interests may come in conflict in the online world.1
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1 To our knowledge, claims regarding the autocomplete function of search engines appear in over 25 cases
that have been brought before courts in more than 10 jurisdictions. Four of these cases have reached the
relevant Supreme Court (one in Germany and three in France). Claims have been brought on the basis of
both common law torts and statutory rights: defamation, false light, damage to business reputation, negli-
gence, inducement to copyright infringement, trade mark infringement, breach of privacy and data protec-
tion law. Many cases have been settled before reaching a judgment.
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This technical feature, which is now commonly provided by all search modules,2
means to speed up the process of entering a query by ‘suggesting’ the word(s) that
a user would type before the user actually finishes entering the query in the search
bar. Through these ‘suggestions’, words may be automatically completed or associ-
ated with other words based on a complex algorithm. The main factors that influence
the algorithm are the popularity of searches made by Internet users and of the
web pages indexed by the search engine, even though other objective factors are
also taken into account, such as the user’s geographical location and their prior
search history.3
Legal problems arise when the algorithm generates a combination of words that is
capable of conveying a deceitful or misleading message. For instance, a person’s or a
business’s name may be associated with terms suggesting dishonest activities, such as
‘fraud’ or ‘scam’,4 or revealing unwanted details on one’s person past.5 In some
instances, the association may not just be frustrating or embarrassing for the person
or business, but purely groundless, mistaken or false.6 On a different matter, by effect
of the popularity of search queries, the title of a song or of a film may be regularly
associated with terms like ‘torrent’ or ‘megaupload’, thereby directing users’ surfing
towards the troubled waters of online piracy.7 In the same vein, trademarks may
2 Not only by ‘general’ search engines like Google, Bing or Yahoo!, but also by ‘vertical’ search engines as
those implemented, for instance, on eBay and Amazon (see Cosmetic Warriors Ltd v Amazon.co.uk Ltd
[2014] EWHC 181 (Ch), discussed below, Section 8).
3 Google search engine employs three related features: Google Instant, Autocomplete (also known as
Google Suggest), and Related Searches. As soon as a user starts typing a term in the search box: (i)
Google Instant predicts what the user is looking for and shows results; (ii) autocomplete displays a menu
of ‘search predictions’; and (iii) searches related to the term (Related Searches) appear near the bottom of
the page. Users can report ‘offensive predictions’ made by Autocomplete <https://support.google.com/
websearch/answer/106230?hl¼en> accessed 20 May 2015.
4 Google/Lyonnaise de garantie, Cour de Cassation, 19 June 2013 (France) (name of a company associated
with ‘escroc’ [fraud]); Direct Energie/Google, Tribunal de Commerce de Paris, Ord 7 May 2009 (France)
(name of a company associated with ‘arnaque’ [scam]); Albert Tanneur Institut & Co c. Google Inc,
Tribunal Cantonal du Jura, 12 February 2011 (Switzerland) (name of a person and company associated
with ‘scam’); OLG Hamburg, 3 U 67/11, 26 May 2011 (Germany) (name of a company associated with
‘fraud’ [Betrug] and ‘conspiracies’ [Machenschaften]); OLG Munich, 29 U 1747/11, 29 September 2011
(Germany) (name of a company association with ‘abzocke’ [rip-off]); X c. Google Tribunale Ordinario di
Milano, N RG 2012/68306, 25 March 2013 (Italy) (person’s name associated with ‘setta’ [sect], ‘plagio’
[brainwashing] and ‘truffa’ [scam]).
5 Mme C/Google France, TGI Montpellier, 28 October 2010; aff’d in CA Montpellier Ch 5, s A, 29
September 2011 (France) (plaintiff’s name associated with title of adult movie); Pierre B. /Google Inc,
Cour de Cassation, 19 February 2013 (France) (name associated with words ‘viol’ [rape], ‘condamne´’
[sentenced]); LG Mo¨nchengladbach, 10 O 170/12, 5 September 2013 (Germany) (plaintiff’s name associ-
ated with ‘Stasi’, the secret police of former East Germany); Rechtbank Amsterdam, 19 October 2014
(Netherlands) (association with name of well-known crime journalist who covered the event where the
plaintiff was involved).
6 Guy Hingston v Google Inc, US District Court, SACV 12 - 02202 JST (name of a person associated with
‘bankruptcy’); LG Munich, 17 June 2013 (TV-Wartezimmer GmBH) (Germany) (name of a company
associated with ‘Insolvenz’ [insolvency]); OLG Ko¨ln, 15 U 199/11, 10 May 2012 (Germany) (person’s
name associated with ‘Scientology’); X c. Google, Tribunale Ordinario di Pinerolo (Italy), 23 March 2012
(name associated with ‘indagato’ [under investigation] and ‘arrestato’ [under arrest]).
7 Syndicat National de l’E´dition Phonographique (SNEP)/Google, Cour de Cassation, 12 July 2012 (France).
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appear in the search bar as effect of word associations in a way that allegedly causes
confusion.8
Whereas many cases of this nature have been judicially examined all over the
world, the outcomes have been diverse and legal uncertainty remains.9 In some
instances, the search engine was found liable for defamation upon receiving notifica-
tion of allegedly offensive content, and in other cases it did not. Based on compar-
able assumptions, courts have upheld claims for inducement of copyright
infringement and dismissed allegations of damage to reputation. The search engine’s
freedom of speech and freedom to conduct business has been variously balanced
against users’ personality and business interests. Similarly, the safe harbour provisions
for Internet intermediary activities have been inconsistently weighted against
the possibly active role of the search engine as publisher, as content provider or as
data controller.
Besides the fact that courts may reach different conclusions as to the liability of
the search engine, the logic they follow in reaching a judicial outcome varies substan-
tially to an extent that no solid judicial trend can be assumed. This is not only
because laws protecting personality and corporate rights differ from jurisdiction to
jurisdiction, and there are also variations on a case-by-case basis, but also because of
the ambiguity as to whether algorithmically determined word combinations can
actually bear a connotative meaning that could thereinafter result in legal implica-
tions. With the lack of a settled legal contour on how to determine whether auto-
mated associations in the context of online searches can determine liability, the
questions inevitably arise: can search suggestions have a meaning that could be
offensive, defamatory, prejudicial to business reputation, or that can it even induce
illicit behaviours, such as copyright or trademark infringement? If this is the case,
what are the obligations of the operators of search engines for the suggestions
generated by their algorithms? And what is, and should be, the extent of their
responsibility?
In this article, we discuss the relevant rulings to argue that search engine liability
for autocomplete suggestions can better be understood on the background of
another, more fundamental question, namely: what is the legal nature of
‘search queries’ and who owns the data generated by the collective effect that these
queries may produce? Based on the judgment of the Court of Justice of the
European Union (CJEU) in Google Spain v AEPD,10 we conclude that many requests
for removal of suggestions including private individuals’ information will be success-
ful on the basis of EU data protection law, even absent prejudice to the person
concerned. However, no general obligation can be assumed for suggestions
related to companies or public persons’ names, or otherwise colliding with property
or image rights.
8 OLG Braunschweig, 2 U 8.12, 2 March 2014 (Poster Lounge) (Germany). See also Cosmetic Warriors Ltd v
Amazon.co.uk Ltd [2014] EWHC 181 (Ch) (UK) (trade mark associated with names of competing prod-
ucts in Amazon’s scroll-down menu).
9 See n 1.
10 Google Spain SL v Agencia Espan˜ola de Proteccio´n de Datos (AEPD), Case C-131/12, 13 May 2014.
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2. FACILITATING THE SEARCH: PREDICTING SEARCHES OR
ORIENTING THE USERS?
The autocomplete or word completion feature was reportedly initially designed to
assist people with physical disabilities to increase the typing speed.11 It was then
increasingly applied in search engines and other software—databases, web browsers,
email programs, word processors—to facilitate typing the ‘right’ word(s) when sub-
mitting a search query, or entering an email address, or texting a message. Today,
there is practically no interactive software applied to computers or smart devices that
does not incorporate an autocomplete function as default.
Despite slight variations in the way that the algorithm works, the auto-suggestive
keyword services share the purpose of making search easier and faster. How is this
‘facilitation’ of searches to be understood? The automatically generated suggestions
are referred to in some instances as ‘predictions’,12 or elsewhere as ideas and sugges-
tions through which users will ‘stop guessing’.13 It is an open question, however,
whether the algorithmically produced suggestions ‘predict’ what the users would
have in any case searched for, or whether they draw the users’ attention to searches
they would have not otherwise thought of. The everyday experience with search en-
gines indicates that suggestions may have both functions: when one types a word,
the appearing list of word combinations normally includes an assortment of pertin-
ent and irrelevant searches, sometimes with the addition of searches that, although
not matching the initial intent of the user, indulge one’s curiosity and evoke new
search patterns. In this last case, ‘facilitation’ takes the meaning of ‘orienting’, rather
than just speeding up, the search. It is mainly in this scenario that search suggestions
become legally relevant.
The ambiguity as to the nature and effect of search suggestions has in fact
received wide judicial scrutiny. In a case brought before the Tribunal de Grand
Instance of Paris and eventually decided by the Supreme Court,14 for example, it was
found that a suggested search indulges users’ curiosity and orients them towards
searches that may hence influence in turn the algorithm. Such a ‘snowball effect’
goes against the ‘neutral algorithm’ argument that was set forward by Google in its
defence. Far from reflecting neutrally users’ preferences, Instant Search can direct
users’ attention to other searches: by attracting user curiosity, it could orient them
towards searches they would have not otherwise performed.15
11 ‘System and method for providing autocomplete query using automatic query transform’ US Patent No
20070050352 A1.
12 <https://support.google.com/websearch/answer/106230?hl¼en> accessed 20 May 2015.
13 <http://www.bing.com/toolbox/keywords> accessed 20 May 2015.
14 M. X./Google Inc., Eric S. et Google France, Tribunal de Grande Instance de Paris, 8 September 2010 (deci-
sion reversed by the Court of Appeal, 14 December 2011; the Court of Cassation confirmed the appeal
decision on 19 February 2013). The effect has been discussed also in Bruno L., Resources et actualisation/
Google Inc., Google France, TGI Paris, 23 October 2013.
15 This potential ‘vicious cycle’ has also been discussed by reference to the impact of algorithmic suggestions
on US Congressmen. See Kate Turmarello, ‘Search Engines are a Thorn on Congress’ Side’, Roll Call, 5
October 2013 <http://www.rollcall.com/issues/57_78/Google-Searches-Are-a-Thorn-in-Congress-Side-
211376-1.html> [‘If Google autocomplete suggests a certain search term . . . people are more likely to
search it; the more people search a certain term, the more likely Google autocomplete is to suggest it’.]
accessed 20 May 2015.
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The assumption that the algorithm does not merely ‘predict’ searches—but could
also potentially orient users towards particular searches—is also indirectly demon-
strated by the very application of policy filters that ban certain words from being dis-
played on the search bar as suggestions. In particular, pressure from the
entertainment industry and government officials has induced search engines to
exclude words such as ‘bittorrent’, ‘torrent’ and ‘rapidshare’ as of 2010.16 The word
‘megaupload’ has also been banned further to a decision of the French Supreme
Court in 2012.17 More recently, Google has removed the word ‘GrooveShark’, which
is the name of a free streaming company.18 By the same token, filters have also been
inserted to avoid the completion of words that would amount to hate speech.19 This,
however, has not stopped the French organization ‘SOS Racisme’, along with an-
other five organizations to sue Google for hate speech in May 2012. According to
the claim, suggestions featured in Google’s search bar, such as the words ‘Jew’ or
‘Jewish’ after the names of certain public figures, potentially exposing anti-Semitic
hate speech. This was allegedly perpetuating stereotypes and advanced racist ideas
about Jewish conspiracies. Although it would have been interesting to see what the
court would have to say on the matter, the claim was dropped after the parties
reached an agreement, about which no further details were given to publicity.20 A
year before the settlement in France, a similar complaint was filed in Argentina by
the Jewish organization DAIA, according to which Google was displaying results for
76 sites which DAIA regarded as ‘highly discriminatory’. Ordering Google to remove
automatic suggestions to these sites in Argentina, the Buenos Aires Court stressed
that, although censorship is illegal under Argentine law, there is a constitutional right
protecting individuals from discrimination, pointing out that similar decisions had
been issued in earlier cases involving printed material.21
16 ‘Google starts censoring Bittorrent, Rapidshare and more’, Torrent Freak, 26 January 2011 <https://
torrentfreak.com/google-starts-censoring-bittorrent-rapidshare-and-more-110126/> accessed 20 May
2015. For a discussion on Google’s policy on filtering search results see Danny Friedmann, ‘Paradoxes,
Google and China: How Censorship can Harm and Intellectual Property can Harness Innovation’, in
Aurelio Lopez-Tarruella (ed) Google and the Law. Empirical Approaches to Legal Aspects of Knowledge-
Economy Business Models (Springer 2012) 303.
17 Syndicat National de l’E´dition Phonographique (SNEP)/Google France, (n 7). See discussion below, Section
8.
18 Jimmy Haas, ‘Google’s autosuggest blacklists GrooveShark’, zumit, 23 July 2013 <http://zumic.com/
2013/07/23/googles-autosuggest-blacklists-grooveshark/> accessed 20 May 2015. Similarly, up until
recently, Google had blocked the term ‘bisexual’ from search results generated through the autocomplete
function after a campaign by BiNet and other advocacy groups. For a catalogue of words that are black-
listed by Google Instant see ‘Google Blacklist—Words That Google Instant Doesn’t Like’ (2010) 2600
Hacker Quarterly <https://www.2600.com/googleblacklist/> accessed 20 May 2015.
19 <https://support.google.com/websearch/answer/106230?hl¼en> accessed 20 May 2015.
20 See Eric Pfanner, ‘Racism Lawsuit against Google Dropped’, NY Times, 27 June 2012 <http://www.
nytimes.com/2012/06/28/technology/racism-lawsuit-against-google-dropped.html?_r¼0> accessed 20
May 2015.
21 Mariano Castillo and Catherine E Shoichet, ‘Argentine Court Blocks Google’s “suggested” Searches’,
CNN, 19 May 2011 <http://edition.cnn.com/2011/TECH/web/05/18/argentina.google/index.html>
accessed 20 May 2015.
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Further to the decision of the European Court in Google Spain v AEPD, Google
has eventually changed its policy with regards to Autocomplete, allowing users to
‘report offensive predictions’ by submitting a form.22
Where possibly defamatory suggestions are made via the search engine algorithm,
the question is whether the search engine should be held liable for these suggestions
or not. In this connection, determining liability will largely depend on whether
the suggestions generated by the algorithm can be construed as meaningful sentences
such as statements of facts or even ‘opinions’ expressed by the operator of the search
engine.
3. SEARCH SUGGESTIONS AS CONSTITUTIONALLY PROTECTED
OPINIONS: FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT
The issue is of particular relevance to a jurisdiction like the USA, where opinions
may find protection under the constitutional principle of freedom of speech.23 In the
USA, opinions that result in ‘statements on matters of public concern’ are protected
both when they are about public figures and private individuals,24 although in the
latter case the constitutional shield is more vulnerable.25 As expressed by the
Supreme Court in a landmark case which clarified the scope of the so-called ‘opinion
privilege’ under US constitution:
‘A statement of opinion relating to matters of public concern which does not
contain a provably false factual connotation will receive full constitutional
protection.’26
Accordingly, three conditions must be met for an act of speech to receive consti-
tutional protection: (i) there has to be a ‘statement of opinion’; (ii) the statement
must relate to ‘matters of public concern’; and (iii) it must not contain a ‘provably
false factual connotation’.
To understand search suggestions as a form of speech in the first place, however,
one has to consider that US courts have gradually expanded the notion of ‘statement
of opinion’ to include any presentation of information and facts, such as lists of
names, stock listings, cooking recipes and computer program source codes.27 Along
this line, it has been suggested that the US jurisprudence supports the view that
algorithm-based decisions—and, in general, outputs of an entirely automated
22 <https://support.google.com/websearch/answer/106230?hl¼en> accessed 20 May 2015. See discus-
sion below, Section 7.1.
23 US Const amend I. Also see New York Times Co. v Sullivan (1964) 376 US 254. In Milkovich v Lorain
Journal Co. (1990) 497 US 1, 20, the US Supreme Court established that there is no wholesale defam-
ation exemption for opinions.
24 New York Times Co. (n 23).
25 Rosenbloom v Metromedia, Inc. (1971) 403 US 29, 70–71; Gertz v Robert Welch, Inc. (1974) 418 US 323,
343–46 .
26 Milkovich v Lorain Journal Co. (1990) 497 US 1, 20.
27 For a discussion on the definition of ‘speech’ under the first amendment see Sorrell v IMS Health, Inc.
131. On the issue of search engine liability for defamation in the context of the autocomplete function
see Michael L Smith, ‘Search Engine Liability for Autocomplete Defamation: Combating the Power of
Suggestion’ (2013) 2 J L Tech Pol 313.
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process—are protectable under the First Amendment, as long as the algorithm or
the automated process ‘communicates’ a message to an audience.28
In particular, the argument that search results are constitutionally protected
speech, has been initially put forward as a defence to accusations of unfair practices,
such as exclusion or de-ranking of websites from search results, or anti-competitive
behaviour, such as, prioritizing search engine’s own thematic search results over re-
sults originating from competitors.29 In a White Paper commissioned by Google in
2012,30 Volokh and Falk argue that search engines operate in the same way as media
enterprises, which exercise a legitimate editorial judgment ‘about what users are likely
to find interesting and valuable’.31 This such judgment comprises the decision about
which information to include and which to exclude from search results, and which
are the results to prioritize. In their view, the fact that the choices are implemented
through a computerized algorithm does not reduce the protection offered
through the First Amendment, as the algorithm itself is written by humans and there-
fore embodies a human editorial judgment. Even if users may expect that Google
presents the results on the basis of supposedly ‘neutral’ algorithms, ‘Google has never
given up his right as a speaker to select what information it presents and how it
presents it.’32
This approach has been adopted in court decisions too, in relation to claims about
the removal or the de-ranking of certain websites in search results, both on allegedly
commercial and political grounds. In Search King v Google, the complaint was about
purposeful and malicious de-ranking of certain websites in Google search results.33
The court upheld Google’s argument that its Page Rank system represents speech
protected by the First Amendment, and any act aimed at knowingly and intentionally
modifying the ranking of websites is legitimate expression of the freedom of
speech.34 The point was also peripherally made in Langdon v Google, Yahoo! and
28 Stuart M Benjamin ‘Algorithms and Speech’ (2013) 161 U Penn L Rev 1445. For an opposite view see
Oren Bracha and Frank Pasquale, ‘Federal Search Commission? Access, Fairness, and Accountability in
the Law of Search’ (2008) 93 Cornell L Rev 1149 (arguing that the First Amendment does not preclude
regulation of the ability of search engines to manipulate and structure their results).
29 For a discussion of the antitrust controversies around Google, see Sophie von Loon, ‘The Power of
Google: First Mover Advantage or Abuse of a Dominant Position?’ in Aurelio Lopez-Tarruella (ed)
Google and the Law. Empirical Approaches to Legal Aspects of Knowledge-Economy Business Models
(Springer 2012); Frank Pasquale, The Black Box Society: The Secret Algorithms that Control Money and
Information (Harvard UP 2015) 165–68.
30 Eugene Volokh and Donald M Falk, ‘First Amendment Protection for Search Engine Search Results’, 20
April 2012 <http://ssrn.com/abstract¼2055364> Accessed 20 may 2015.
31 ibid 5. According to the authors, ‘Google, Microsoft’s Bing, Yahoo! Search, and other search engine com-
panies are rightly seen as media enterprises, much as the New York Times Company or CNN are media
enterprises’ 10.
32 ibid 17. See also Josh Blackman, ‘What Happens if Data is Speech?’ (2014) 16 U Penn J Const L 25.
33 Search King, Inc. v Google Technology, Inc., Inc No 02-1457, 2003 (WD Oklahoma, 27 May 2003). The
plaintiff was profiting by selling ad space on websites ranked highly by Google’s Page Rank system.
Google admitted it intentionally decreased the ranking of the websites at issue because the plaintiff’s ac-
tions undermined the integrity of the system.
34
[A] PageRank is an opinion—an opinion of the significance of a particular web site as it corres-
ponds to a search query. Other search engines express different opinions, as each search engine’s
method of determining relative significance is unique . . . While Google’s decision to
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Microsoft Corp., where one of the complaints was that the defendant search engines
had removed the plaintiff’s website from search results, thereby acting in a fraudu-
lent, arbitrary and punitive way.35 The court dismissed this claim on the ground that
the defendants had legitimately exercised an ‘editorial decision’ and, consequently,
had a constitutionally protected right to choose what information to display in search
results and what to exclude.36 The same conclusion was reached by the New York
District Court in Jian Zhang v Baidu.37 The plaintiffs in this case were a group of
writers and bloggers who were active in the pro-democracy movement in China.
They claimed that the search engine Baidu.com was conspiring to prevent their polit-
ical speech by blocking from its US search results articles and other information con-
cerning the democracy movement in China. In dismissing the claim, the Judge
observed that
[t]here is no irony in holding that Baidu’s alleged decision to disfavor speech
concerning democracy is itself protected by the democratic ideal of free
speech . . . [T]he First Amendment protects Baidu’s right to advocate for
systems of government other than democracy (in China or elsewhere) just as
surely as it protects Plaintiffs’ rights to advocate for democracy.38
If search results are no less than a way to ‘advocate’ for a cause, the same can be
said of autocomplete suggestions. Through search results, the search engine
‘expresses’ its ‘opinion’ as to what information is relevant to the user in a particular
search; similarly, through the autocomplete function the search engine expresses a
further ‘opinion’ as to what is worth searching in the first place. Both are acts of free
speech, and both are worth constitutional protection.
However attractive in its simplicity, this argument is flawed in some important
respects and is based on a number of assumptions that are all but self-explanatory.
First, it is questionable that the act of returning search results or search suggestions
in response to queries can qualify as a ‘statement of opinion’ in the first place. Even
within a judicial trend that has expanded the notion of ‘speech’ to include various
instances of the so-called ‘non-verbal communication’—such as symbolic speech,
intentionally deviate from its mathematical algorithm in decreasing Search King’s PageRank may
rise questions about the ‘truth’ of the PageRank system, there is no conceivable way to prove
that the relative significance assigned to a given web site is false. A statement of relative signifi-
cance, as represented by the PageRank, is inherently subjective in nature. Accordingly, the
Court concludes that Google’s Page Ranks are entitled to First Amendment protection (Search
King, Inc. v Google Technology, Inc, 11).
35 Langdon v Google, Yahoo! and Microsoft Corp., 474 F Supp 2d 622 (D Del 2007). To the plaintiff, the re-
moval of a website from search results merely on the ground of its politically inconvenient content was in
contradiction with the express Google’s policy statements that their search results are objective and neu-
tral, and made Google’s content policy fraudulent and deceptive. The lawsuit concerned two websites,
one exposing fraud perpetrated by various North Carolina officials and one delineating atrocities commit-
ted by the Chinese government.
36 ibid. The court relied on the principle that the right of free speech guaranteed by the first amendments
‘compris[es] the decision of both what to say and what not to say’ (Riley v National Federation of the
Blind of North Carolina, Inc. (1987) 487 US 781, 796–97).
37 Jian Zhang et al. v Baidu.com Inc. (2014) Case No 11 Civ 3388 (JMF), SD New York.
38 ibid 16.
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commercial and functional messages—the construction of pure algorithmic outputs
as ‘opinions’ remains problematic. As Tim Wu convincingly argues, a fully inclusive
theory of the First Amendment that treats as ‘speech’ anything that can be labelled
as an ‘opinion’ simply because it ‘sends a message’ to an audience, is ‘hopelessly over-
broad’ and eventually impracticable.39 For instance, such a construal does not allow
to make a distinction between purely functional ‘messages’, such as the sound of a
car alarm or the instructions provided by a GPS sat nav, and expressive messages
properly so called.40
Secondly, the analogy between search engines and media publishers, on the
ground that both subjects select and choose the information they present to the pub-
lic, is not entirely appropriate. What confers the status of ‘speaker’ to a newspaper or
to a broadcaster is not just the fact of selecting what to present and how to present
it, but, most importantly, the fact of ‘endorsing’ the information which is presented.41
The media publisher ‘owns’, in a way, the information it presents to the public, while
this is not true for a search engine. To be sure, there is not, nor there can be, en-
dorsement over the information contained in the websites a search engine ranks. In
our view, it is equally questionable that the search engine ‘owns’ or endorses the
autocomplete search suggestions. This is because autocomplete suggestions are
based on automated processing of ‘users’’ searches; they are not independent and au-
tonomous outputs of the search engine’s algorithm.
Curiously enough, as we will discuss later on in this article, a number of courts in
Europe have dismissed claims against Google precisely because the suggested word
associations in Instant Search are ‘not’ ‘speech’ in the first place, and therefore are
not capable of conveying a meaning—let alone a defamatory or libellous meaning.42
What constitutes a possible defence under US law may result in liability under the
laws of EU countries.
4 . SEARCH SUGGESTIONS AS SPEECH THAT CANNOT BE
PROTECTED: BALANCING THE TORT OF ‘FALSE LIGHT’ AGAINST
THE FIRST AMENDMENT
While search suggestions may be constitutionally protected as sui generis forms of
speech, they nevertheless may be actionable inasmuch as they contain either a prov-
able false factual connotation or an otherwise misleading message, thereby triggering
a tort of ‘false light’. This is what happened in a case brought by a medical doctor
before a US District Court in California.43 According to the complaint, when some-
one typed ‘Guy Hin . . . ’ into the Google search bar, the words ‘Guy Hingston
Bankrupt’ appeared, even though the search results directed to articles that had abso-
lutely nothing to do with a bankruptcy associated with Dr Hingston. The latter
39 Tim Wu, ‘Machine Speech’ (2013) 161 U Penn L Rev 1495. For a distinction between (protectable)
non-verbal communication acts and (non-protectable) conduit, see J Thomas dissent in Virginia v Black
(2003) 538 US 343.
40 ibid 1518–21 (arguing that US jurisprudence contains an implicit ‘functionality doctrine’, whereby func-
tional elements of a communicative act are not protected by the First Amendment).
41 ibid 1528.
42 See below, Section 6.2.
43 Guy Hingston v Google Inc, US District Court, SACV 12 - 02202 JST (AN x).
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contended he has never gone bankrupt, and that this deceptive association generated
by Instant Search has resulted in loss of clients.
The plaintiff voluntarily dismissed his claims before the court could rule on the
merits of the case. Despite the fact that the suggestion contained a provable false fac-
tual connotation, it is dubious whether such a claim could succeed. There are three
main reasons for this, all related to the particularity of defamation laws in the USA.
First it is not clear whether the publication will be found to be ‘in false light’. This is
a notoriously ambiguous tort and whereas Californian law shares similarities with
defamation, it does not require a false statement of fact but a false implication of
fact.44 What is important for a successful complaint is that the publication must iden-
tify or be ‘of and concerning’ the plaintiff. Internet users are aware that personal
names featuring in search results may refer to different persons, and the very possibil-
ity that there is somewhere another Guy Hingston that has gone bankrupt implies
that a reasonable user would not be confused.45 We ought to keep this consideration
in mind, as we will discuss later on the ways in which names, in addition to some
other information, qualify as personal data. Secondly, for a publication to be action-
able in false light there is need for probable falsity. Here the court has to balance the
claim of false light against the First Amendment right of free speech of the search
engine. If the statement ‘cannot be read to imply the assertion of an objective fact’,
the plaintiff’s claim will fail.46 This means that the plaintiff ought to demonstrate that
the search terms are assertions of such objective facts and this may be hard to estab-
lish, as the terms appear in the context of searches performed by users. Thirdly,
if the suggestion points to factual connotations contained in third parties’ websites—
for instance, websites where the words at stake are in one way or another
associated—then the claim may fall foul of the Communication Decency Act.47
According to section 230 of this Act, ‘no provider or user of an interactive computer
service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by
another information content provider’.
In Parker v Google, the court rejected the claims of defamation, invasion of privacy
and negligence against Google for making third-party defamatory content available
via search results, on the ground that ‘[i]t is clear that section 230 was intended to
provide immunity for service providers like Google on exactly the claims Plaintiff
raises here.’48 The same argument was adopted in Stayart v Yahoo, where the plaintiff
raised claims of false endorsement and violation of the right of publicity against
Yahoo!, Alta Vista and Friendfinder.49 When the plaintiff put her name into Yahoo!
and the other search engines, she found herself linked to ‘a sexual dysfunctioning
drug, hard-core pornographic websites, and an on-line pharmacy promoting CialisVR ’.
To the court, however, the plaintiff failed to demonstrate that she had a commercial
44 Established in Gill v Curtis Publishing Co, 239 P.2d 630 (Cal 1952).
45 See eg Tamkin v CBS Broadcasting Inc, 193 Cal App 4th 133, 146–47 (the fact that a fictional character
had the same name with the plaintiff did not suffice to demonstrate that the work refers to the plaintiff).
46 Partington v Burliosi, 56 F 3d 1147, 1157 (9th Cir 1995).
47 47 USC s 230.
48 Parker v Google, Inc., 422 F Supp 2d 492, decision summary aff’d, 242 Fed Appx 833 (3d Cir 2007), cert
denied 522 US 1156 (2008).
49 Stayart v Yahoo! Inc et al (2009) Case 2:09-cv-00116-RTR.
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interest in her name, and therefore had no standing under section 43(a) of the
Lanham Act.50 As no intellectual property offence could be demonstrated, the
defence of section 230 wholly applied and the case was dismissed.
With regards to autocomplete suggestions, it could be argued that search engines
are exempt from liability under section 230 insofar as the word associations reflect
content appearing in the search results. It is only when the suggestion objectively
points to a false statement that the search engine may be obliged to remove it. No
general obligation to comply with requests of removing words associations can be
inferred from US law.
While the analogy with media enterprises may discharge search engines from
liability in the USA, on the ground of the likely constitutional protection of search
suggestions as acts of speech, it may have the opposite effect in other jurisdictions
where laws impose more strict conditions on public speech. This is notably the case
for defamation law in the UK, where a higher standard of common law liability is
imposed on ‘publishers’ as subjects who have control over content.51
5. THE TORT OF DEFAMATION: IS A SEARCH ENGINE A ‘MEDIUM’
OR A PUBLISHER?
The discussion as to what search ‘facilitation’ includes becomes central in deciding
whether the search engine functions as a publisher or as an innocent intermediary.
Despite the fact that suggestions are algorithmically generated and collated on the
basis of certain objective factors, it can be argued that it is the search engine that is
their publisher. This is because it would only be the search engine to know details of
the numbers of Internet users typing a particular search and other relevant informa-
tion, even though it is each individual Internet user that ‘activates’ the algorithm by
entering the query. Obviously, the search engine operator cannot have control on
each and every suggestion or list of results that it is generated on millions of users’
screens. It has, however, the capacity of excluding certain word associations from ap-
pearing, as policy filters demonstrate. Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that, after
having received notification of a given association, the search engine becomes aware
that the algorithm produces such an association and is in a position to take action. Is
this awareness sufficient to qualify the search engine as a ‘publisher’ and then fix it
with liability for publishing defamatory associations?
In the UK, there is a long established line of authority that a person involved only
in dissemination is not to be treated as a publisher, unless two conditions are met.
First, to qualify as a publisher, the person must have an intention to publish the con-
tent, and should not merely play a passive intermediary role.52 The second condition
is that they should have either actual or constructive knowledge of the content of the
publication, namely, in case of defamation, that they knew or ought to have known
50 The court also refused to allow the plaintiff to re-plead her complaint and proceed on statutory and com-
mon law invasion of privacy ‘on the ground of futility’ (ibid 24–25).
51 Andrew T Kenyon, Defamation: Comparative Law and Practice (Routledge-Cavendish 2006); Elizabeth
Samson, ‘The Burden to Prove Libel: A Comparative Analysis of Traditional English and U.S.
Defamation Laws and the Dawn of England’s Modern Day’ (2012) 20(3) Cardozo J Intl Comp Law.
52 McLeod v St. Aubyn [1899] AC 549.
Search engine liability for autocomplete suggestions  11
 by guest on A
ugust 1, 2015
http://ijlit.oxfordjournals.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
by the exercise of reasonable care that the publication was likely to be defamatory.53
If one of these conditions is not met, the defence of ‘innocent dissemination’ can be
invoked. This standard applies also with respect to Internet service providers and
search engines. In Bunt v Tilley,54 it was found that, to establish liability, there must
be a ‘mental element’ that cannot be established in instances where the service pro-
vider performs no more than a passive role in facilitating Internet access.55 A similar
test was applied in Metropolitan International Schools Ltd v Designtechnica Corpn56 in
relation to defamatory comments that, having been posted on a website, appeared as
‘snippets’ of information when an Internet search took place under the claimant’s
name on Google search engine. The Judge found that for a person to be responsible
for publishing defamatory words there needs to be a mental element, which was
absent in this case. This is because the search is performed automatically and
involves no input from the search engine, ‘which had not authorised or caused the
snippet to appear on the user’s screen in any meaningful sense but had merely by
the provision of its search service played the role of a facilitator’.57
The situation changes, however, once the ‘facilitator’ receives information that
defamatory content has been published through its services. Common law instructs
that a person can in principle be liable for the publication of libel by acquiescence, ie
by permitting publication to continue, on condition that he or she has the power to
prevent it.58 In this connection, search engines differ from other Internet service pro-
viders (ISPs) such as hosting services, as they have no power of control over the con-
tent that appears in search results. On this basis, Eady J in Metropolitan found that it
is ‘hardly possible to fix Google Inc with liability on the basis of authorisation, ap-
proval or acquiescence’.59
This argument was considered in Tamiz v Google, where the Court of Appeal
faced the question of whether Google is a publisher of certain defamatory comments
appearing on a blog hosted on the Blogger platform.60 Google, in the context of
Blogger, acts as a hosting service, not as a search engine: it provides a platform for
the blogs along with advertising and hence it has control over them. Its involvement
is not such, however, as to qualify it as a primary publisher of the blogs, ie vicariously
liable for its users. Nor is it a secondary publisher facilitating publication as a distribu-
tor. However, these considerations change when Google receives notification.
According to Richards LJ,
53 Emmens v Pottle (1885) 16 QBD 354, 357–58; Vizetelly v Mudie’s Select Library Ltd [1900] 2 QB 170,
177–80; Bottomley v FW Woolworth and Co Ltd (1932) 48 TLR 521.
54 Bunt v Tilley [2007] 1 WLR 1242.
55 ISPs who did not host a website were found to have a passive instrumental role and to be liable they
ought to have ‘a knowing involvement in the process of publication of the relevant words’ (ibid s 23). See
also Tamiz v Google [2013] EWCA Civ 68 s 18ff. were the Judge made an analogy between Blogger and a
graffiti wall ‘festooned overnight with defamatory graffiti’.
56 Metropolitan International Schools Ltd v Designtechnica Corpn [2011] 1 WLR 1743.
57 Tamiz (n 55) s 20.
58 See the cases quoted above, n 53.
59 Metropolitan International Schools Ltd (n 56) s 58.
60 Tamiz (n 55).
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‘if Google Inc allows defamatory material to remain on a Blogger blog after it
has been notified of the presence of that material, it might be inferred to have
associated itself with, or to have made itself responsible for, the continued
presence of that material on the blog and thereby to have become a publisher
of the material’.61
In Tamiz, hence, Google could not benefit from the defence of section 1 of the
Defamation Act 1996 because after notification they knew or had reason to believe
that their continued hosting of the materials caused, or contributed to, the publica-
tion of a defamatory statement.62
In a case that was brought before the Supreme Court of Virginia in Australia,63
Beach J found that once a search engine knows of a complaint of defamation, it can
be treated as a publisher of that content, if it does not remove the offending material
within a reasonable time. The case was brought against Google by Mr Trkulja, after
discovering that his name was linked to criminal activities and Melbourne’s under-
world in Google’s web and images’ search results. Curiously enough, this link was
accidentally generated by websites reporting an event that occurred to the plaintiff
some years before as he was victim of an onslaught in a restaurant of Melbourne. In
finding for the plaintiff, Beach J concluded that Google intended to publish the
material produced through its automated systems, because that is what they are
designed to do upon a search request being typed into the search engine.64
Awarding the plaintiff the sum of $200,000, Beach J held that:
[t]he question is whether, after relevant notice, the failure of an entity with
the power to stop publication and which fails to stop publication after a
reasonable time, is capable of leading to an inference that that entity consents
to the publication . . . Further, if that inference is drawn then the trier of fact
is entitled (but not bound) to conclude that the relevant entity is a
publisher.65
What Trkulja, Tamiz, Davison and Metropolitan International Schools instruct is
that search engines cannot be considered as publishers unless two conditions—
translating the common law requirements of ‘power of control’ and ‘mental
element’—are met, namely (i) the search engine ‘hosts’ the allegedly defamatory
material (and does not only ‘direct towards’ it), and (ii) it receives ‘notification’ of
the defamatory content. Once these conditions are met, the search engine can escape
liability only if it acts to remove the content within reasonable time.
61 s 34. The judge took into account Byrne v Deane [1937] 1 KB 81 (Deane (defamatory content left on the
notice board of a golf club amounted to participation in publication) and cases that repeated the same
principles, such as Davinson v Habeeb and Others [2011] EWHC 3031 (QB) (Google’s role in relation to
Blogger was that of a ‘provider of a gigantic noticeboard on which others published defamatory
material’).
62 A similar outcome would have likely been reached under the Defamation Act 2013, according to which
the term ‘publisher’ has the same meaning as in section 1 of the Defamation Act 1996 (art 10(2)).
63 Milorad Trkulja v Google Inc LLC (No 5), No 10096/2009, [2012] VSC 533.
64 Above s 18.
65 s 31.
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Relevant in this regard are the EU provisions on e-commerce and in particular
the immunities offered to Internet service providers for caching and hosting
content online.
6 . INTERMEDIARY LIABILITY: WHEN DO THE E-COMMERCE
DEFENCES WORK?
Under EU Law, a search engine can rely on two main defences for information soci-
ety services, namely caching and hosting. Caching is the ‘automatic, intermediate and
temporary storage’ of information in the course of a communication between third
parties, whereas hosting is the ‘storage of information provided by a recipient of the
service’. By reference to the search engine service we are considering in this article,
the main difference between the two defences is that the hosting defence requires
that the service expeditiously removes illicit content upon obtaining knowledge or
awareness of it. The caching defence, by contrast, only requires that the service re-
moves or disables access to content when it receives actual knowledge that the con-
tent has been removed from the network, or when a court or an administrative
authority orders the removal.66
The availability of these defences for search suggestions has been extensively dis-
cussed by national courts of European countries, where they have been balanced
against diverse national doctrines on direct and indirect liability to reach, in some
instances, divergent outcomes. Given the lack of harmonization in many of these
underlying doctrines—tort law, defamation, personality rights, etc.—it is no surprise
that the immunities provided by the e-commerce directive are not applied consist-
ently across European countries, leaving strong discrepancies not only between
common law and civil law jurisdictions, but also within civil law systems.67 Perhaps
more interestingly, the immunities may also apply differently, within the same juris-
diction, to different torts committed by means of autocomplete, namely defamation,
copyright infringement or breach of data protection law. In the following, we
examine the trends in civil law jurisdictions, by considering how claims on defam-
ation and damage to business reputation have been dealt with by a number of
European courts.
One of the leading judicial trends focuses on the specificity of the autocomplete
function compared to the ‘standard’ operations routinely performed by search en-
gines. In this respect, the courts’ reasoning is premised on ‘unpacking’ the services
offered by the search engine operator and taking autocomplete as a separate feature
with its own characteristics. While indexing and linking to web pages in search results
do not normally imply liability as to the content that the users search, the autocom-
plete function introduces, in the search process, an additional source of informative
content of which the search engine is solely responsible. By suggesting search queries
and related searches, the operator of a search engine is no longer a mere facilitator or
66 Dir 2000/31/EC on e-commerce, arts 13 (caching) and 14 (hosting). For a thorough discussion in rela-
tion to defamation see Jan Oster, ‘Communication, Defamation and Liability of Intermediaries’ (2015)
35(2) Legal Stud 348.
67 For a thorough discussion in relation to copyright law see Christina Angelopoulos, ‘Beyond the Safe
Harbours: Harmonising Substantive Intermediary Liability for Copyright Infringement in Europe’ (2013)
3 IPQ 253.
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a technical distributor of information but it takes on an active role and is liable as
such for the message conveyed by its service. Specifically—depending on the ver-
naculars of national laws—the search engine operator may be treated as a publisher,
an interferer (Sto¨rer) or a content provider (fornitore di contenuti). So far, the most
authoritative decision in this line of cases is a judgment laid down by the German
Federal Supreme Court in 2013.68
On the contrary, courts have denied search engine liability based on two main
arguments, frequently working in tandem. One is that the algorithm simply reflects
the popularity of users’ searches, and is therefore a neutral technical instrument that
does not express ‘what Google thinks’. As a consequence, the disputed suggestion is
not illicit content, since lists of suggestions and related searches are per se devoid of
any inherent meaning: they are tools to facilitate the search, and Internet users
understand that they have this function. The second argument is that a duty to
remove search suggestions would impose obligations that are not compatible with
the functioning of a search engine, or that would unduly restrict freedom of informa-
tion. This line of reasoning, too, has found support in Supreme Court, and in par-
ticular in the judgments of the French Cour de Cassassion in July 2012 and in
February 2013.69
We discuss the two opposite judicial trends and their implications on search
engine liability separately.
6.1 When the search engine is liable: isolating the autocomplete effect and
applying the ‘user expectation’ argument
As exemplary of the argument developed by European courts to refuse immunity
under the e-commerce Directive, we can consider a decision of the Tribunal of
Milan, Italy, in 2011.70 In this case the focus was on the liability of a search engine
under the safe harbour provisions for caching and hosting.71 The claimant brought
proceedings against Google on the basis that his name and surname featured next to
the words ‘truffatore’ and ‘truffa’ (scam, fraud) when users typed the name in the
search bar. The court found that the hosting defence could not apply since, in its
view, the defence covers exclusively ‘the activity of the storage of information pro-
vided by others’. To the court ‘this kind of complaint is not about the hosting activ-
ities of Google, but about . . . an association which, clearly, is the product of a
specific way of working . . . a software developed by Google’.72 To conclude that the
search engine was liable for the particular defamatory word association, the court
stressed its role in developing the ‘related searches’, which is part of the autocom-
plete service. It was found that Google is hosting the combined results of all of its
users’ searches, and is in turn making them available to other users. This activity
qualifies as ‘storage of information provided by a recipient of the service’ within the
meaning of the Directive. However, the provision of automatically produced
68 BGH, Case No VI ZR 269/12 of 14 May 2013. See discussion below, nn 84–88 and accompanying text.
69 Google/Lyonnaise de garantie (n 4); Pierre B./Google Inc (n 5). See discussion below, nn 89–94 and
accompanying text.
70 AB v Google, Tribunale Ordinario di Milano, 24 March 2011.
71 D Lgs 70/2003, arts 15 and 16 (corresponding to arts 13 and 14 of the e-commerce Directive).
72 ibid.
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suggestions based on this information is a conscious and commercially focused deci-
sion made by the company, which exceeds the mere hosting of users’ searches.73
In a case heard two years later on similar facts, the Court of Milan further clarified
the interpretation of the hosting defence.74 Citing CJEU’s L’Oreal v EBay in sup-
port,75 the court explained that the immunities provided by the e-commerce
Directive have a character of ‘exceptionality’, which must not be construed exten-
sively. In the court’s opinion, exclusions from liability must be ‘limited to situations
where the service provider is a mere intermediary of the information, totally unrelated
to the content and thereby completely passive with respect to the content transmitted
by third parties on the internet’.76 After setting such a high threshold for immunity,
the court moved on to consider the autocomplete function in the framework of
Google’s activities as a hosting service and coined the definition of ‘active hosting’:
by this, it referred to a service in between a content provider and a passive and neu-
tral intermediary, but one that could in any case be unable to invoke the hosting de-
fence. Although word associations generated automatically by the autocomplete
function are not ‘logically and grammatically complete sentences’, they may never-
theless ‘suddenly evoke a meaningful concept or information’ related to the searched
subject. The injunction must be specifically targeted to associations capable of evok-
ing information with defamatory content.77
The assumption that search suggestions and related searches are fully fledged
‘informative content’, and not simply the neutral reflection of users’ habits, underlies
many of the rulings against Google in other jurisdictions too. In Direct Energie, the
Tribunal de Commerce of Paris found that the association of a company’s name with
‘arnaque’ (scam) as first in a list of 10 search suggestions engenders as a minimum
‘the suspicion of a commercially questionable behaviour’ on the side of the company.
This is even more so, as the suggested term is not contained in the search result fea-
turing in the first position, nor is the first in alphabetical order.78 This way, Google
takes part (albeit involuntarily79) to a ‘derogatory campaign against Direct Energie’
and, in this connection, the request of removal is not unjustified or disproportionate
in relation to freedom of expression.
In another French ruling on similar facts,80 the argument of a possible conflict
with freedom of expression was dismissed on the ground of a surprisingly narrow
interpretation of such freedom: to the court, a literal reading of Article 10 of the
73 A similar conclusion was reached in the French case Mme C/Google France (n 5).
74 Tribunale di Milano, Ordinanza 23 May 2013.
75 L’Ore´al SA and Others v eBay International AG and Others, Case C-324/09, 12 July 2011.
76 Tribunale di Milano (n 74) 6–7 (emphasis added).
77 In this case, the court found that the association of the name of a private person with the terms ‘sect’ and
‘brainwashing’ in the context of internet searches did not ‘induce immediate elaboration of a definite con-
cept’, and therefore cannot have defamatory meaning; by contrast, the association of the name of a legal
person (in this case, a foundation) with the same words ‘renders immediately a full meaningful concept,
namely that the legal entity in question is a sect’.
78 Direct Energie/Google, Tribunal de Commerce de Paris, Ord 7 May 2009.
79 The ‘good-faith excuse’ was found prevailing in Pierre B./Google Inc (n 5). See discussion below, nn 95-98
and accompanying text.
80 Bruno L., Resources et actualisation/Google Inc., Google France, (n 14) (person’s and company’s name asso-
ciated with ‘escroc’ [swindler] and ‘secte’ [sect]).
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Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms makes
clear that ‘freedom of expression’ is a right that applies to ‘persons’, and cannot be
invoked to protect the automated functioning of a search engine application.81 The
fact, however, that the laws applicable to human thinking cannot apply to machine-
generated content, does not lift the owner of such machine from civil liabilities.
Specifically, the court observed that the adjective ‘pertinente’ (related), which is used
to qualify the automated search,82 induces users to believe that the suggestions are
topical to the subject, so that the suggested terms obtain a value that goes beyond
the popularity of searches. In this connection, the lack of information about the
flawed character of related searches and the search suggestions resulted in the tort of
negligence as per article 1383 of the French Civil Code.83
In all these rulings, courts have resolved the issue of whether automatically gener-
ated search suggestions can have defamatory meaning by shifting the focus from the
‘source’ of the content (ie the algorithm that generates the suggestions and the
related searched) to the ‘recipient’ of the information (ie the Internet user). In this
respect, a key element in the assessment of the defamatory effect of search sugges-
tion is the expectation that search engines generate on users. This element is at
the heart of the German Federal Supreme Court decision of 2013.84 In this case, the
claimant, who owed a cosmetics company under his name, found that his name was
associated with the words ‘scientology’ and ‘fraud’. Overturning two earlier deci-
sions,85 and quashing the findings of a number of German lower courts,86 the
Federal Supreme Court found in favour of the claimant. It held that Google was
liable for not having removed false associations upon receiving notification from the
claimant. Mere word associations have the capacity of being defamatory as such, and
they can convey a meaning irrespective of whether they are read in conjunction to
search results or not. The autocomplete function creates an expectation to Internet
users: because the algorithm-driven search program incorporates the searches previ-
ously made by other users, and presents current users with the combination which
is most frequently appearing in search results, users expect that ‘the search queries
completed through the suggested word combination reflect content-related relation-
ships.’87 Otherwise put, the word association has an informative meaning—despite
the fact that there may not be search results confirming this association—because
users expect that the associations are informed by real content indexed by Google.
81 ibid. The incipit of art 10 reads in French: ‘Toute personne a droit a` la liberte´ d’expression’ (emphasis
added). The reading of the court is narrow, in the sense that it disregards the right to receive information
as constitutive to freedom of expression (alongside the right to impart information). Compare the US jur-
isprudence on freedom of speech discussed above, Section 3.
82 The Court referred specifically to the Google’s information page on Autocomplete <https://support.
google.com/websearch/answer/106230?hl¼fr> accessed 20 May 2015.
83 Bruno L., Resources et actualisation/Google Inc., Google France (n 80) 5.
84 BGH Case VI ZR 269/12 of 14 May 2013. For a comment: Karl-Nikolaus Peifer ‘Google’s Autocomplete
Function—is Google a Publisher or a Mere Technical Distributor?’ (2014) 3 QMJIP 318.
85 LG Ko¨ln, 28 O 116/11, 19 October 2011 and OLG Ko¨ln (n 6).
86 OLG Hamburg (n 4) (‘Internet users do not assume search results are statements of the search engine’);
OLG Munich, 29 U 1747/11, 29 September 2011 (Autocomplete is a purely automated process; there is
no ‘own expression of content’ by Google).
87 ibid 9
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On the basis of this ‘expectation’ argument, the court maintained that the predictions
generated by the algorithm are ISP’s ‘own information’, and not information stored
at the request of the recipients of the service. While the hosting defence cannot
apply, the court nonetheless recognized that Google, as a ‘technical’ instead of ‘intel-
lectual’ distributor,88 has a duty to react upon receiving knowledge that given infor-
mation is breaching personality rights. It does not, however, have a general
obligation to search for infringements committed by the autocomplete algorithm.
6.2 When the search engine is innocent: the functional approach to
autocomplete or the ‘mere facilitation’ argument
The legal effect of the lack of human intervention in the production of search sugges-
tions is one of the most controversial points challenging European courts. In two
decisions of the French Supreme Court (Cour de Cassation), the charge on Google
was dismissed on the ground that word combinations generated by the autocomplete
function are not an expression of thought or intellectual reasoning, but a technical
method to facilitate the search.89 This means that no defamation complaint can
flourish, as defamation laws, to apply, require the expression of an opinion. We will
call this the ‘functional approach’ to autocomplete search suggestions. According to
this approach, the combination of words is devoid of any meaning and does not
imply the intention to link one word to another.90
Lyonnaise de garantie was a case on the association of the name of a company with
‘escroc’ (fraud) in the third place of the list of suggested searches. Reversing the deci-
sions of two lower courts,91 the Cassation found that word combinations in the con-
text of search suggestions have no autonomous meaning since they do not represent
a judgment or opinion.92 It moved on to stress that the filters that Google applies,
for instance, on pornographic content are not relevant or sufficient to give autono-
mous meaning to word associations.93 Hence, it concluded that ‘the automatic and
instantaneous display of keywords in the search bar is devoid of any intrinsic mean-
ing and constitutes a mere search tool for internet users, and one that directs them
to websites that may contain the keywords’.94
The same conclusion was reached in an earlier case, where infringement of per-
sonality rights was discussed.95 Here the claimant was a private person who had been
involved in a case of corruption of a minor, for which he received a three-year sen-
tence in 2010. When entering his name on Google search bar, suggested words such
as ‘viol’ (rape), ‘condamne´’ (sentenced) and ‘sataniste’ (Satanist) appeared, and the
88 Under German Law, strict liability is imposed only to ‘intellectual distributors’, while mere technical dis-
tributors are only liable insofar as a causal element can be established between the ‘interference’ to the
dissemination and the infringement (Sto¨rerhaftung). See Peifer (n 84) 323.
89 Pierre B./Google Inc (n 5); and Google/Lyonnaise de garantie (n 4).
90 A similar conclusion was also reached in Omnium Finance/Google and JFG Networks, TGI Paris, 22 July
2010 (‘Google suggest . . . appears to the user as a tool to help the search . . . and not as a statement of
the search engine vis-a`-vis the plaintiff’).
91 TGI Paris, 18 May 2011 and Court of Appeal of Paris, 14 December 2011.
92 Google/Lyonnaise de garantie (n 4) 5–6.
93 ibid 6, point 4.
94 ibid 6.
95 Pierre B./Google Inc (n 5).
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claimant requested an injunction to remove these allegedly defamatory suggestions.
The claim was upheld by the first instance court,96 but dismissed in appeal.97
Confirming the decision of the Court of Appeal, the Cassation held that, when assess-
ing the intentional element of defamation, ‘due account’ should be taken to the
‘functionality’ of the autocomplete suggestions:
although the expressions [denounced by the claimant] are in a literal sense
defamatory, at the stage of the assessment of the mental element [of defam-
ation] they must be considered according to their functionality, which is to
facilitate the access to websites dealing with or considering the issue addressed
in the expression.98
Here the court draws a distinction between the ‘literal sense’ of a word association
and its ‘functionality’ once it appears in a technical tool whose sole purpose is to facili-
tate search and access to websites. In the latter case, the meaning of the association—if
any—can only be revealed after the search has taken place. No infringement of person-
ality rights can be ascribed to the service that provides this functionality.
We will discuss later the question whether this argument is tenable from a data
protection perspective, especially in the light of the broad scope given by the
European Court to the notion of unlawful data processing.99 For now, we can
observe that the position developed by the French Cassation Court—setting aside
the literal meaning and focusing only on the functional element of the automated
word association—develops a line of reasoning that deprives word associations from
any intrinsic meaning. According to this position, algorithmically generated predic-
tions merely enable easier navigation of the web. There is no user expectation to be
assumed as to the credibility of the suggestions, as in the German jurisprudence. The
search engine defence on lack of human intervention weighs heavily in this judicial
stance, which adopts a purely instrumental theory as to the nature of automated
word associations. The function of the algorithmic search suggestion tools becomes
hence primordial in understanding the value and legal implications of automated
word suggestions. Since its purpose is recognized as lying on the facilitation of
Internet search, same is the purpose and function of algorithmically generated word
combinations, with nothing more to be assumed than the functional value that they
hold. As we will see later, the ‘facilitation’ argument may lead to the opposite conclu-
sion when the claim is directed to infringement of intellectual property rights: in this
connection, ‘facilitating’ access to illegal websites may be sufficient to charge the
search engine with indirect liability.100
96 TGI Paris, 8 September 2010. To the court, the word association, although merely functional to the
retrieval of ‘real’ search results, was defamatory at least ‘by insinuation’. The Court also found that the
suggestions are not purely dependent on algorithmic calculations, but include some discretionary elem-
ents, as demonstrated by the fact that the same search on Yahoo! provides completely different
suggestions.
97 CA Paris, 14 December 2011.
98 Pierre B/Google Inc (n 5).
99 Google Spain SL (n 10). See discussion below Section7.
100 See below Section 9.
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Yet, in the context of infringement of personality rights, the argument that mere
word associations have no independent meaning is also reflected in other national
courts’ decisions, namely in Italy and Switzerland. In Italy, the First Instance Court
in Pinerolo found that ‘the mere association of words in a search string is not a state-
ment but, depending on the purpose of the software, it is better assimilated to a
question’.101 Word associations may embed opinions and hence have a derogatory
meaning only in instances where the fact is not true ‘and’ the question is either rhet-
orical or maliciously asked. In the present case, the name of the plaintiff was auto-
matically associated with the words ‘arrestato’ (under arrest) and ‘indagato’ (under
investigation). The Court of Pinerolo held that these suggestions cannot as such
damage the reputation of the claimant because ‘the context in which the word associ-
ations appear in the Google search bar excludes that the question is a rhetorical one
or one that has maliciously been asked’. It moved on to observe that even the less
informed Internet users could not have been misled since the results of the search
performed using the suggested terms make clear that the plaintiff has neither been
arrested nor is subject to investigation.
Similarly, the Court of Milan too rejected the claimant’s argument that Google is a
content provider and hence responsible for the allegedly defamatory terms ‘setta’ (sect),
‘plagio’ (brainwashing) and ‘truffa’ (scam) featuring next to the claimant’s name, and
that of the charity organization bearing his name.102 Here the Judge found that Google
is acting as a caching service, rather than as a content provider, and on this basis it can
benefit from the relevant exemption incorporated in the e-commerce Directive.103 The
automated suggestions are algorithmically determined, and hence do not fall under
Google’s control in the sense of being structured, organized or influenced.
This functional approach has been upheld by a lower court in Switzerland too,
where the breach of personality rights has been balanced with concurring private and
public interests, and in particular the constitutional right of freedom of informa-
tion.104 Contrary to the findings of lower French Courts on the same point,105 the
Cantonal Tribunal of Jura found that imposing an obligation to remove suggestions
that are threatening to one’s own personality right ‘would impose to search engines
an obligation which is not proportionate and which would restrict inadmissibly the
right to information’. This is because search engines would be obliged to intervene
‘without having the capacity to verify the legitimacy or not’ of a request and ‘under
risk of incurring civil or even criminal liabilities for not intervening’. To the court,
such an obligation ‘would make almost impossible the management of a search
engine and, consequently, the use of the Internet, thereby bringing a serious offence
to the right of information’.106
101 X c. Google, Tribunale Ordinario di Pinerolo, (n 6), 9.
102 X c. Google, Tribunale Ordinario di Milano (n 4). Compare this decision with the opposite judgment ex-
pressed by the same court two years earlier on 24 March 2011 (see discussion above nn 70-73 and
accompanying text).
103 art 15 of Decreto Legislativo 70/2003, implementing art 13 of the e-commerce Directive (‘caching’).
104 Albert Tanneur Institut & Co c. Google Inc. (n 4). Freedom of information is protected by art 17 of the
Federal Constitution of Switzerland.
105 See below Section 8.
106 Albert Tanneur Institut & Co c. Google Inc. (n 4).
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Beyond defamation, claims of violations of data protection law can also be made.
The question of whether an obligation to remove search results is a proportionate
limit to freedom of information and freedom of doing business is at the core of the
decision of the CJEU in Google Spain v AEPD.107
7. SEARCH SUGGESTIONS WITH NO FALSE FACTUAL MEANING:
DATA PROTECTION AND THE ‘RIGHT TO BE FORGOTTEN’
In a very controversial judgment, which stands in sharp contrast to the opinion of
the Advocate General,108 the European Court responded to the question in the af-
firmative: the right that personal information, which is irrelevant or out of date
should not be made available to the public by its inclusion in search results
‘override(s), as a rule, not only the economic interest of the operator of the
search engine but also the interest of the general public in finding that informa-
tion upon a search relating to the data subject’s name’.109
The scope given by the European Court to this right is remarkably broad: it covers
instances where personal information has been initially made available on the
Internet legitimately, or where the information is true,110 as well as instances where
the inclusion of the information in search results does not cause any prejudice to the
person.111
The basis for such a broadly construed personal right is the so-called ‘right to be
forgotten’, as encompassed in the rights to erasure and blocking of personal data pro-
vided for in Article 12 of the Data Protection Directive.112 To the court, the activity
of indexing, storing and making available in search results web pages that incidentally
contain personal data is ‘processing’ of those data, and the operator of the search
engine is the ‘controller’ of those data within the meaning of the Directive.113 As
such, the operator of a search engine is bound by all the obligations that the
Directive imposes on data controllers, specifically the duty to comply with the prin-
ciples of data quality (Article 6)114 and with one of the criteria for legitimate data
107 Google Spain SL (n 10).
108 Opinion of Advocate General Ja¨a¨skinen, Case C-131/12, 25 June 2013.
109 Google Spain SL (n 10) s 97.
110 ibid, ss 93–94.
111 ibid, s 99.
112 Dir 95/46/EC. The ‘right to be forgotten’ is codified in the proposed data protection regulation; see
Proposal for a General Data Protection Regulation, Brussels, 25 January 2012 COM(2012) 11 final, art
17 (‘Right to be forgotten and to erasure’). For a comment see Giovanni Sartor ‘The Right to be
Forgotten in the Draft Data Protection Regulation’ (2015) 5 IDPL 64. For a discussion on the compati-
bility of the right to be forgotten with US constitutional law, see Robert K Walker, ‘The Right to be
Forgotten’ (2012) 64 Hastings LJ 257.
113 Dir 95/46/EC, art 2(b) and (d). In the Opinion of the Advocate General, the operations carried out by
a search engine are a ‘processing’, but the operator of a search engine is not a ‘controller’ of personal
data included on third-party web pages (Opinion of AG, Case C-131/12, ss 75 and 84–90). To the
court, Google is a controller insofar as it determines the ‘purpose and means’ of data processing (Google
Spain SL (n 10) s 33).
114 The principles set forth in art 6 are: (i) fairness and lawfulness, (ii) purpose limitation, (iii) proportion-
ality, (iv) accuracy, and (v) limitation on data retention.
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processing listed in Article 7.115 In the context of the operations carried out by
search engines, the most relevant criterion is the one established in Article 7(f),
namely processing that is ‘necessary for the purpose of the legitimate interests’ of the
data controller. The scope of this legitimate interest, which has to be balanced
against ‘the interests for fundamental rights and freedoms of the data subject’,116 has
been largely debated and is subject to controversy.117 In Google Spain, the court took
the view that compliance with the ‘legitimate interests’ criterion in connection to
search engine operations can only be determined on a case-by-case basis, in the con-
text of either requests of erasure or blocking submitted by data subjects under Article
12(b) (encompassing the ‘right to be forgotten’), or the exercise of the right to
object data processing provided for in Article 14(a). These requests may be
addressed by the data subject directly to the controller who must then ‘duly examine
their merits and, as the case may be, end processing of the data in question’,118
namely remove links to websites containing a particular information from the list of
results that are displayed following a search made on the basis of the person’s name.
It is only when the data controller does not comply with the request that the data
subject may bring the matter before the supervisory authority.
7.1 The (short) life of algorithmic suggestions after Google Spain
Although Google Spain is a decision on search results, its connection with autocom-
plete suggestions is straightforward. If search engines are ‘controllers’ of personal
data that merely happen to be included in web pages, they are a fortiori controllers
with respect to data submitted by users when entering a search query. In fact, when
users enter a person’s name in the search bar, the data is processed by the algorithm,
which combines it with other information and displays a list of suggested searches
that may in turn disclose other personal information. It is, therefore, reasonable to
conclude that the obligations imposed by the CJEU with respect to search results ex-
tend to search suggestions as well. This is also because autocomplete suggestions
may undermine, and even reverse, the effect of a removal of search results.
Suppose—as in the facts of Google Spain—a data subject obtains the removal, from
the list of search results that are displayed when users perform a search based on his
name, of information lawfully published on the Internet. While the information no
longer appears in the list of results, autocomplete may facilitate users to retrieve it by
carrying out an alternative search using suggested words. What is relevant to the ex-
ercise of the right to be forgotten, as well as to the right to object specific data pro-
cessing under Article 14(a), is the capacity to break the ‘link’ between one’s own
identity and particular information concerning their person. In this respect, the
115 These are: (i) consent of the data subject, or processing necessary; (ii) to perform a contract; (iii) to
comply with legal obligations of the data controller; (iv) to protect vital interests of the data subject; (v)
to perform public interest or official authority tasks; and (vi) to pursue a legitimate interest of the data
controller.
116 Dir 95/46/EC (n 113) art. 7(f).
117 For an authoritative discussion see Article 29 Working Party Opinion 06/2014 on the Notion of
Legitimate Interests of the Data Controller, Adopted on 9 April 2014.
118 Google Spain SL (n 10) s 77.
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obligations should extend to any technical means that facilitates the reconstruction
of such link.
The Google Spain decision expands the scope of requests for removal of autocom-
plete suggestions both in a procedural and substantial way. As we have seen, in the
aftermath of Google Spain requests can be submitted directly to the operator of the
search engine, who has a duty to examine their merits and react accordingly.119
All major search engine operators have already put in place a ‘notice and take down’
procedure, similar to the one adopted in some jurisdictions for claims on copyright
infringement, to deal with requests of removal of search results.120 The complaint
web forms we have examined do not include reference to autocomplete sugges-
tions.121 It is only Google that has recently included, for users browsing from the
EU, a separate procedure to request the exclusion of ‘offensive’ ‘predictions’.122
From a substantial point of view, this recent change in Google’s policy may have
been enacted as a result of Google Spain, which extends the ground to request for
removal to instances where autocomplete suggestions do not need to convey a
defamatory meaning or false factual information. This is an important point, as the
European Court recognizes to an extent a right to determine the way in which infor-
mation about oneself is organized and presented to the public. A recent case, which
follows up on litigation that started over seven years ago, indicates that applications
to seek interim injunctive relief for misuse of personal information may be far more
successful after Google Spain. It is the case of Max Mosley, the former head of
Formula One involved in a British tabloid sex scandal in 2008. Mr Mosley’s applica-
tion for an injunction against News Group Newspapers was refused in 2008, on the
ground that the relevant material—video footages of Mr Mosley engaging in sexual
activities with prostitutes—had become so widely accessible that either the claimant
no longer had a reasonable expectation of privacy in relation to it, or it would make
little practical difference to accept his application.123 The Google Spain judgment,
119 The factors to be considered in this examination include the nature of the information, its sensitivity to
the data subject and the interest of the public in receiving that information—an interest which may de-
pend ‘on the role played by the data subject in public life’ (ibid, s 81). See also Article 29 Working Party
Guidelines on the Implementation of the CJEU Judgment on ‘Google Spain v AEPD and Gonza´lez’ C-131/
12, Adopted on 26 November 2014.
120 Google was the first operator of a search engine to adopt such a procedure, followed by Microsoft’s
Bing and Yahoo! For an analysis of Google’s take down notice see Ben Allgrove and Ian Walden
‘Google Responds to ECJ’s Decision on the Right to be Forgotten’ (2014) 9 WCRR 31.
121 See Google, ‘Search Removal Request under Data Protection Law in Europe’ <https://support.google.
com/legal/contact/lr_eudpa?product¼websearch> accessed 20 May 2015; Bing, ‘Request to Block
Bing Search Results In Europe’ <https://www.bing.com/webmaster/tools/eu-privacy-request>
accessed 20 May 2015; Yahoo!, ‘Requests to Block Search Results in Yahoo Search: Resource for
European Residents’ <https://uk.help.yahoo.com/kb/SLN24378.html?impressions¼true> accessed 20
May 2015. Ask does not have in place a complaints form, but invites users to submit removal requests
by email in its ‘Privacy policy’ <http://about.uk.ask.com/about/terms_conditions/privacy.html> ac-
cessed 20 May 2015.
122 <https://support.google.com/websearch/answer/106230?hl¼en> accessed 20 May 2015. The ‘take
down’ notice is available to users browsing from some jurisdictions only; for example, it is not available
to users in the USA.
123 Mosley v News Group Newspapers Ltd [2008] EWHC 687 (QB) s 36. See, however, Mosley v News Group
Newspapers Ltd [2008] EWHC 1777 (QB), where Mr Mosley obtained a judgment against News Group
Newspapers and record damages. For a comment, see Angius McLean and Claire Mackey, ‘Mosley v
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however, gave Mr Mosley a new opportunity to seek the removal of those photo-
graphs on the basis of the Data Protection Act and in Mosley v Google, it was found
that he has ‘a viable claim which raises questions of general public interest, which
ought to proceed to trial’.124
It is widely accepted that search engines have ‘a decisive role in the overall dis-
semination’125 of information about one’s person. The way in which such informa-
tion is organized, aggregated and presented by the search engine, for instance
through lists of search results ordered by relevance—but also by suggesting searches
that are relevant to a person—may enable users ‘to establish a more or less detailed
profile of the data subject’.126 In this respect, search engines not only organize and
make information provided by others retrievable, but also supply a ‘distinctive’ and
‘additional’ layer of data processing, which enables Internet users to obtain ‘a struc-
tured overview of the information relating’ to an individual, ‘and thereby to establish
a more or less detailed profile of him’.127
7.2 Balancing private and public interests
Significantly, the right to be forgotten, broadly construed as a right to organize one’s
own information, cannot be overridden by a legitimate interest of the data controller:
it can only be balanced against a ‘preponderant interest’ of the general public to
access that information, specifically when the data subject plays a role in the public
life. Does this limitation preclude public persons from relying on this ground to
request the removal of search results or autocomplete suggestions? One such case,
perhaps one that has attracted a greater level of publicity, is the case of Bettina
Wulff, the wife of the former German Federal President. Mrs Wulff filed a defam-
ation suit at the District Court of Hamburg against Google, on the ground that when
typing her name in the Google search engine, the words ‘Bettina Wulff escort’, and
‘Bettina Wulff prostituierte’ resulted.128 The case was settled before trial, although—
with the recent amendment of Google’s policy on ‘offensive predictions’ in the after-
math of Google Spain—litigation may have not even been strictly necessary. What
Google Spain instructs, however, is that special attention should be paid:
on the nature of the information in question and its sensitivity for the data sub-
ject’s private life and on the interest of the public in having that information,
an interest which may vary, in particular, according to the role played by the
data subject in public life.129
News Group Newspapers Ltd: How Sadomasochism Changed the Face of Privacy Law: a Consideration
of the Max Mosley Case and Other Recent Developments in Privacy Law in England and Wales’ (2010)
32 EIPR 77.
124 Mosley v Google [2015] EWHC 59 (QB) s 55.
125 Google Spain SL (n 10) s 36.
126 ibid, s 37.
127 ibid, s 80.
128 Reported in Spiegel Online <http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/defamation-case-by-bettina-
wulff-highlights-double-standard-at-google-a-854914.html> accessed 20 May 2015.
129 Google Spain SL (n 10) s 81.
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Balancing private and public interests in this connection implies an assessment of
the role of the data subject in public life coupled with an assessment of the informa-
tion as such. According to the Article 29 Working Party, the criterion of the ‘role in
public life’ must be construed broadly, and does not cover ‘public figures’ only.130
With respect to public figures, there is a strong presumption against de-listing search
results relating to them, unless the information is ‘genuinely private’. The criterion is
the one developed by the European Court of Human Rights in von Hannover
v Germany:
[A]lthough in certain special circumstances the public’s right to be informed
might even extend to aspects of the private life of public figures, particularly
where politicians were concerned, this would not be the case—even where the
persons concerned were quite well known to the public—where the [informa-
tion] related exclusively to details of the person’s private life and had the sole
aim of satisfying the curiosity of a particular readership in that respect. In the
latter case, freedom of expression called for a narrower interpretation.131
A case-by-case assessment would be hence necessary as the public may have an
interest in the disclosure of certain private information related to a public figure, on
condition that such an interest is not merely that of ‘satisfying the curiosity’.132 In
the UK, for instance, there are a number of cases concerning the construction of the
public interest when information about public figures is released.133 Essentially,
courts engage in a balancing exercise that includes weighing the public interest in
maintaining confidence against a countervailing public interest favouring disclosure.
What is taken into consideration is not only the fact that someone is a public figure,
but also the nature of the information as such.134
In cases where the data subject has no prevalent role in public life, courts will
have to balance the right to be forgotten with the interest of public to receive infor-
mation, if any. In two cases of this nature discussed before Google Spain, national
courts have reached opposing conclusions. In Madame C v Google,135 which is the
first autocomplete case where data protection law was applied, a French court found
that the association of a personal name with the word ‘swallow’ and the title of an
adult movie where the plaintiff played a role when she was young and inconsiderate,
amounted to disproportionate processing of personal information. The court fixed
130 Article 29 Working Party Guidelines on Google Spain (n 119) 13.
131 Von Hannover v Germany II Case Nos 40660/08 and 60641/08 (ECtHR, 7 February 2012).
132 <http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/files/factsheets/factsheet_data_protection_en.pdf> ac-
cessed 20 May 2015. For a comment: Violette Grac-Aubert, ‘A Love and Hate Relationship? Recent
Developments in Data Protection and Competition Law’ (2015) 36 ECLR 224.
133 See eg Campbell v MGN Limited [2004] 2 AC 457; Mosley (n 124); Douglas v Hello! Limited [2001]
QB 867; for a comment see: Rachael Mulheron, ‘A Potential Framework for Privacy? A Reply to Hello!’
(2006) 69 MLR 679.
134 See eg Sedley LJ in Douglas v Hello! Ltd [2001] QB 967, s 137; Att.-Gen. v Guardian Newspapers (No 2)
[1990] 1 AC 109, 282B-F; see also the discussion on public figures’ ‘reasonable expectation to privacy’
in Campbell v MGN Limited [2004] 2 AC 457.
135 Mme C/Google France (n 5).
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Google with a duty to comply with Madame C’s request to remove those associ-
ations on the basis of the right to oppose data processing.136 A similar claim brought
before a German Court in 2013, however, did not succeed: an ex member of the
secret police of the former East Germany, the infamous Stasi, requested removal
from autocomplete of the association of his name with the word ‘stasi’.137 The court
rejected the claim on the ground that the search engine is not liable for the informa-
tion published in third parties’ websites, to which the plaintiff should address
his claim.
Although this latter decision is likely to be unsustainable in light of Google Spain,
not all claims grounded on the right to be forgotten are automatically expected to
succeed. It will be seen how national courts will balance such a right against the pub-
lic interest in receiving information. In a post-Google Spain case brought before a
Dutch court, a claim on the ground of the right to be forgotten failed because the
public interest in receiving the contested information was found to prevail.138 The
plaintiff in this case was sentenced for attempted murder seven years before the case
was heard, and his name was associated in autocomplete with the name of a well-
known crime journalist who covered the event where the plaintiff was involved.
Google refused to comply with the removal request, and the court upheld Google’s
decision on the ground of balance of interests.
8 . LIABILITY FOR INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY INFRINGEMENT:
TWISTING THE ‘FACILITATION’ ARGUMENT
The downfall of the ‘mere facilitation’ argument discussed earlier139 rests within its
very conceptual construction: since the autocomplete function is meant to direct
users to search results indexed by a search engine, its value as a defence loses its
strength when the word associations direct users to potentially infringing content.
This was found to be the case in SNEP,140 where the ‘mere facilitation’ argument
took a strange twist. Repeating that word associations have no autonomous meaning
and are meant simply to facilitate Internet searches, the French Supreme Court
found that where automated word associations orient users towards keywords that
may induce copyright infringement or other illicit behaviour the search engine may
be found liable. The case was brought before the Supreme Court from the French
phonographic industry lobby (SNEP) that started proceedings against Google for
providing the suggestions ‘Megaupload’, ‘Rapidshare’ and ‘Torrent’ alongside names
of performers and titles of songs. Both the Court of First Instance and the Court of
Appeal had found that such automated word associations do not make Google
responsible for activities performed by Internet users, and did not uphold SNEP’s
claims for piracy censorship in autocomplete suggestions. Overturning the decisions
of the lower courts, the Supreme Court found that Google’s autocomplete feature
actually ‘systematically orients internet users’ towards illegal websites, so that the
136 art 38 loi 6 Janvier 1978.
137 LG Mo¨nchengladbach, (n 5).
138 Rechtbank Amsterdam, (n 5).
139 Above Section 6.2.
140 Syndicat National de l’E´dition Phonographique (SNEP)/Google (n 7).
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suppression of the suggestions at stake would make the search more difficult. To
turn back to our earlier discussion, the algorithmically generated suggestions were
not mere predictions but had the potential of directing users to particular searches
and the capacity of even inducing illicit behaviour. While not totally effective, the
measures requested by SNEP to order the removal of these words from the auto-
complete feature were found capable of ‘preventing or terminating such infringe-
ments’, ‘without compromising the efficiency’ of the search engine.141
On other instances, word associations may not only induce infringing behaviours,
but may represent themselves an infringing use of an intellectual property right. The
matter was discussed in a UK case on unauthorized use of a trade mark in online
retailing: the owner of the mark ‘LUSH’, registered for cosmetics and toiletries, com-
plained that Amazon was using the mark to direct consumers to competing prod-
ucts.142 One of the allegedly infringing uses related to the fact that when a consumer
started typing the search term ‘lush’ in the search bar of Amazon, a drop-down menu
appeared suggesting various products that where similar or equivalent—in a word:
competitive—to those sold by the claimant.143 To the Judge, this is a use of the
claimant’s sign in the course of trade which affected the function of the trade mark
and was capable of confusing the average consumer.144
In these two cases, search suggestions were not considered to be meaningful lin-
guistic units as in the cases involving personality rights. The intellectual property
cases instruct that, even when the value of word associations rests in their instrumen-
tal role as search facilitators, they may have legal significance ‘precisely because’ they
facilitate retrieving information that would otherwise remain obscure, or that may
confuse consumers. In this way, the ‘mere facilitation’ argument by which courts
discharge search engines for autocomplete suggestions returns by the back door to
fix them with liability for copyright or trade mark infringement.
9. CONCLUSION: THE APPROPRIATE SCOPE OF SEARCH ENGINE
LIABILITY
This article was concerned with the liability of search engines for algorithmically gener-
ated search suggestions that may have an offensive or defamatory meaning, or may
even induce infringement of intellectual property rights. Although censoring search re-
sults can be dangerous, there are instances where rights of individuals may be violated
by the algorithm. Search engine liability in the context of automatically generated asso-
ciations brings forward questions over conflicts of rights. On one side, there are
141 ibid.
142 Cosmetic Warriors Ltd v Amazon.co.uk Ltd [2014] EWHC 181 (Ch).
143 ibid, ss 11–13.
144 Quoting the Google France test (Case C-236/08 [2010] RPC 19), Baldwin QC concluded:
In circumstances where there is no overt indication whatsoever that Lush products are not avail-
able for purchase on the Amazon site and where the consumer has been informed (from the
drop down menu) that Lush Bath Bombs are available, I do not consider that the average con-
sumer would ascertain without difficulty that the goods to which he was directed did not origin-
ate from Lush.
ibid, s 66.
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arguments in favour of the protection of the fundamental freedoms of speech and ac-
cess to information, including overreaching principles such as net neutrality or Internet
governance. On the other side, personality rights of individuals on the Internet ought
to be preserved, especially when personal data are processed in a way that is dispropor-
tionate to the legitimate aim of facilitating the search of information online.
We have seen that arguments over the neutrality of algorithms may not offer a
viable defence in all jurisdictions. In the USA, courts tend to uphold claims that the
automatically produced suggestions are constitutionally protected speech. The valid-
ity of this defence is less likely in Europe, however, where freedom of expression
does not commonly cover information imparted by automated applications such as
algorithms. Search engines may be found liable for automatically generated sugges-
tions when these impact on the personality interests of individuals. This is when the
search engines legally qualify as publishers of the autocompleted suggestions. Under
common law, this is likely the case when search engines have an intention to publish
the content and know or should reasonably be aware of the offensive content upon
notification.
Once allegations for defamation or breach of data protection laws arise, search
engines may avoid liability if one of the e-commerce defences for Internet service
providers applies. We have seen that the application of these defences, such as cach-
ing and hosting, has not reached a level of harmonization across the EU and at the
same time these defences tend to be variably applied to different torts, especially in
the context of the autocomplete function. This means that in spite of the availability
of the defences, different outcomes may be reached depending on the tort that has
allegedly taken place, ie defamation, copyright infringement or data protection
breaches.
With regards to defamation by the algorithm, European courts have sporadically
developed a judicial trend upon which liability is more likely to be established when
there are reasonable user’s expectations that the autocompleted suggestion relates to
content that is indexed by the search engine and hence hold some informative value.
The focus in this discussion is not on the source of the content, ie the algorithm, but
on its recipients, who can have a viable claim once false suggestions appear to reflect
content-related associations. This was, for instance, the case in the decision of the
German Supreme Court, where a search engine was ordered to remove such false
suggestions upon receipt of notification from Internet users. In other cases, however,
search engines have escaped liability. This was the case where arguments over the
neutrality of the algorithm, that merely serves a functional purpose, were upheld.
Arguments in favour of freedom of information have also been successful in
some occasions, ie instances where the algorithm was found to merely facilitate the
search.
The so-called facilitation argument was also raised in instances involving allega-
tions for inducement of infringement of intellectual property rights, although in these
cases a different outcome was reached. In this context, liability was established where
automated word associations oriented users towards keywords that could be found
as inducing copyright infringement or other illicit behaviour. It should be borne in
mind, however, that lobbying against intellectual property infringement was powerful
enough as to lead to the ab initio removal of specific keywords, such as the word
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‘torrent’, through policy filters that were mutually agreed between search engines
and the intellectual property industries.
When automated suggestions contain personal information, however, complaints
have to be brought by the specific individuals that have been affected, either on
grounds of defamation or possibly on the basis of data protection law. The case of al-
gorithmically produced suggestions is certainly more straightforward in the aftermath
of the Google Spain case, according to which the processing of data that are no longer
relevant goes against the provisions of EU Law. Although this case dealt with the ob-
ligation to remove search results upon notification, it gives a clear prevalence to argu-
ments favouring a right to informational self-determination that could also apply to
automatically produced suggestions. With the recently introduced obligations of
Internet service providers to remove content upon user requests it is likely that
search engines will soon be under a generalized obligation to erase search
suggestions, irrespective of whether they are offensive, prejudicial or defamatory,
although such a specific request is not specifically listed in the notice and take
down forms that are currently available online. As applied to the autocomplete
function, the doctrinal insight developed in Google Spain is more akin to a right
to organize the information about oneself, in the form of a right of informational
self-determination that seems to include but not limit itself to the right to be
forgotten.
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